

IDEOLOGY: THE CHALLENGE FOR CIVIC LITERACY EDUCATORS

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ABSTRACT: Commitment to open-mindedness, critical thinking, liberty, and social justice are proposed as four pillars of a democratic ideology. The highly charged and polarized discourse between left and right political ideology among the media, politicians, educators, and public has intensified the challenge placed on social studies educators to transmit these goals to their students. A rendition of the philosophical trajectory of the ideas of liberty, social justice, and justice are provided and married with concepts from the philosophical foundations of American education, social studies education goals and strategies, and contemporary humanistic philosophy so as to articulate a new case that transmission of a democratic ideology is at the core of social studies education. The proposition is made that teaching social studies is unique because the development of an ideology requires teachers' attention to values, virtues formation, and the liberation of the individual.

Keywords: Ideology, critical thinking, liberty, social justice, justice

The purpose of this essay is to explore the largely unexamined idea of a democratic ideology as an inherent goal of social studies education. The traditional meaning of competency and literacy established by many disciplines including social studies education (Duplass, 2006) do not fully convey the unique mission of social studies education to pass on an ideology - belief system - to successive generations. The formation of values (Apple, 2004; Duplass, 2008; McCarthy, 1994), the use of critical thinking (Dewey, 1890/1969), and

the goal of passing on democratic traditions (Dewey, 1939/1976; National Council for Social Studies, 2008) serve as an intersection for the formation of a democratic ideology, although such a term is seldom found in the social studies literature. By exploring the issues surrounding a democratic ideology it is hoped that more individuals will come to view a democratic ideology as the ultimate purpose of social studies education. It is proposed that a democratic ideology entails a commitment to open-mindedness, critical thinking, liberty, and social justice. Ideology, specifically a democratic ideology, is the organizing concept of this essay because social studies educators are called upon to cultivate an ideology in their students that they hope will perpetuate a democratic approach to societal governance (Dewey, 1939; 2001).

The formation of an ideology is a highly personal experience and requires balancing the aims of the competing forces of liberty and social justice as one develops a set of civic values and personal virtues. Personal virtues are defined as the “conditions of the soul” such as courage, benevolence, wisdom, temperance, justice, and alike (Aristotle, 1999; Read, 1973) and civic values are defined as dispositions toward beliefs of a communal nature such as “respect for others’ property,” “commitment to justice,” “freedom of speech and assembly,” etc., (Misco & Shiveley 2010, p. 123).

IDEOLOGY

Ideology has been dubbed “the most elusive concept in the whole of social science” (McLellan, 1986, p. 1) and may account for the National Council for Social Studies (NCSS) and other social studies education learned societies’ seldom use of the term in policy statements and standards. However, the idea of teachers doing more than just studying democratic traditions with their students, but that students would be enculturated into a democratic belief system can be found in Dewey (1939, 1946, 2001), Counts (1932), Leming (1992), and Bennett and Spalding (1992).

The term ideology is used in this essay with no pejorative connotations. Rather, the term ideology is defined as how we envision and interpret the world (Gerring, 1997). It is a belief system, a perspective ultimately shaped by one’s personal virtues, civic values, knowledge, and modes of reasoning. When writing about ideology, Wittgenstein (1969) posited that it is “the inherited background against which I distinguish true and false” (p. 94). Ideology is based on what Rawls (2001, p. 19) calls “considered judgments” or “considered convictions”. These convictions are deeply embedded beliefs based on civic values and personal virtues. These are “judgments we view as substantially fixed points: ones from which we never expect to withdraw, as when Lincoln says: if slavery is not wrong, nothing is wrong “ Rawls (2001, p. 29).

Ideology and individual identity formation in students are less developed as concepts in social studies education. Identity formation is how I view myself. It is part of the maturation process that involves deciding who I am and who I want to be (Guignon, 1993). Identity is the platform upon which ideology is constructed (Guignon, 1999; McLellan, 1986; Noel, 2010). Identity is necessary for productive associations within

democratic communities and leads to a political ideology (Parsons, 1951). Political ideology, as a subset of ideology, is a “set of beliefs about the proper order of society and how it can be achieved” (Erikson & Tedin, 2003, p. 64). Whereas, a political platform is comprised of the policies or programs one supports which are in accord with one’s ideology and political ideology (Gerring, 1997, 1998). Free and Cantril (1967), in defining ideology in the political realm, make the same point by distinguishing between “Symbolic” ideology (the abstract ideological holdings such as conservative or liberal, i.e. a political ideology) and “Operational” ideology (the concrete, issue-based opinions, i.e. political platforms). Lincoln’s position on slavery offers a concrete example of the relationships of the three concepts. Abraham Lincoln believed that slavery was unjust, an ideological stance based on his personal virtues and civic values that formed his identity. So his political ideological stance is one of placing greater weight on social justice for African slaves than the liberty (or rights) at the time of slave holders to act in accord with their culture or beliefs. As a consequence he took steps to implement a political platform to end slavery. So it is today that individuals follow this same kind of pathway as their ideology, political ideology, and political platforms evolve (Noel, 2010). In contemporary America, a person’s political ideology, in its most simplistic form, usually means being labeled on a spectrum ranging from liberal to conservative or left or right on various public issues (Gerring, 1997, 1998). Much of the ideological and political ideological conflict over political platform preferences that are voiced in public arenas are based in left/right ideological choices that pertain to classic disputes concerning the proper role of government, power, justice, liberty, authority, privilege, and inequality (Bobbio 1996; Burke 1790/1987).

JUSTICE, SOCIAL JUSTICE, AND LIBERTY

A complicating factor in a dialogue about ideological stances is that the vocabulary can be imprecise and leads to misplaced concreteness. To facilitate the ideas in this paper, I have opted to characterize (as broad a brush as that maybe) a liberal and left leaning political stance as a social justice ideology and a conservative and right leaning political stance as a liberty ideology. Both ideologies often state that government is giving assistance, such as tax breaks, subsidies, etc. to corporations or food stamps, housing assistance, etc. to individuals. Government, in this regard, is a conduit, a facilitator. The common place misstatements, “the government gives me food stamps” or “the small business administration gives me a low interest loan” distort the dialogue and depersonalize the actual events. These statements sound quite different from, “My neighbor gives me food stamps or my neighbor gives me a low interest loan for my business.” The antagonism in public debates and divisions in society might be, in part, attributable to this misplaced concreteness and depersonalization of the relations needed in a civil society.

Justice

Read (1973) points out that “justice” and “social justice” are not the same. For conservatives, it is the “social” in social justice as opposed to just “justice” that implies specific liberal political preferences (Greg, 2013; Read,

1973; Will, 2006). The development of the idea of justice has its origins in Greek antiquity, is complex, and limited here to the most basic concept of justice as a personal virtue and civic value.

Many of today's theories about morality and virtues can be traced to Aristotle (1999). There are, according to Aristotle, multiple virtues such as, justice, temperance, courage, etc. Aristotle argues that justice is unique among the virtues because the other virtues become "just" when individuals act for the good of the community. As an example, it is temperate to limit one's food intake, but it is justice (and an act of benevolence) if someone refrains from eating food because that makes more food available for others (Kraut, 1989). This extends the concept justice from only a personal virtue to a civic value as it establishes the prospect of a duty upon the individual to promote human flourishing (eudemonia) not only of oneself, but of others and communities (Aristotle, 1999; Kraut, 1989).

Also since Greek antiquity, the Principle of Desert as in "you got your just deserts" is deeply embedded in society's idea of justice. It proposes that as a matter of justice, those who act well toward others deserve to be treated well in a civil society (Hurka, 2001). If someone who acts well is not treated well, that would be unjust. Conversely, those who do not treat others well do not deserve to be treated as well as those who do treat others well. Rachels (1997) contends that it would not be a just society (or justice would not exist at all) if society did not reward those who act responsibly better than they reward the irresponsible. Individuals or society may choose to treat individuals who have not acted responsibly better than they deserve, but this would be an act of individual or collective benevolence. Rachels (1997) points out that the intent of deserts is not to punish the irresponsible, but to empower:

Deserts is a way of granting people the power to determine their own fortunes. Because we live together in mutually cooperative societies, how each of us fares depends not only on what we do but on what others do as well. If we are to flourish, we need to obtain their good treatment. A system of understandings in which desert is acknowledged gives us a way of doing that (p. 472).

The interpretation of each these two basic concepts about justice, accounts in part, for the differences between a social justice ideology and liberty ideology.

The Social Justice Ideology

There are a number of perspectives as to what social justice is (Hayek, 1978; Miller, 1999; Novak, 2000). Rizvi (1998) points out that:

"the immediate difficulty one confronts when examining the idea of social justice is the fact that it does not have a single essential meaning - it is embedded within discourses that are historically

constituted and that are sites of conflicting and divergent political endeavors” (p. 47).

Bell (1997) describes social justice as “both a process and a goal” with the ultimate aim being “full and equal participation of all groups in a society that is mutually shaped to meet their needs” (p. 3). Murrell (2006) describes social justice as “a disposition toward recognizing and eradicating all forms of oppression and differential treatment extant in the practices and policies of institutions, as well as a fealty to participatory democracy as the means of this action” (p. 81). What constitutes equal participation, oppression, and differential treatment is in large measure a function of one’s idea of justice and deserts.

The term social justice can be viewed as resting on four principles. First, social justice is a matter of redistributing goods to improve the lives of the disadvantaged (Freire, 1980; Gutierrez, 1971/1988). Social justice is argued to be needed because society has a duty to provide for individuals a fair share of opportunities and resources that correct, to some extent, the chance circumstance of birth and upbringing. Institutions of society are viewed as favoring and sustaining certain starting places over others. Combined, especially deep inequalities are created, meaning they are not easily remedied (Rawls, 1971), “it is these inequalities, presumably inevitable in the basic structure of any society, to which the principles of social justice must in the first instance apply” (p. 7). Second, in addition to the traditional view of goods as representing wealth in the financial sense, the idea of goods includes cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1986) and access to decision making; that is, all forms of resources that bring power to the individual. Third, this redistribution is interpreted as a right of the relatively disadvantaged as opposed to an opportunity. And fourth, a role of government is to redefine rights and redistribute resources through its elected officials to insure “a more equal and equitable balance of powers that will enhance and multiply the effective liberties of the mass of individuals” (Dewey, 1987, p. 362).

Critique. Lou Read (1973) called the social justice ideology a “Sheltering Ideology” which he described as:

Protection from life’s problems-seeking refuge from difficulties-not by building and strengthening one’s own intellectual and physical assets but by using force or coercion to live off the resources of others. In politico-economic parlance these sheltering ideologies range from protectionism and state interventionism to socialism, welfarism, the planned economy, Nazism, fascism, Fabianism, communism (p. 40).

He argues that justice requires only the absence of deterrents to the “creative aspirations of any individual” as opposed to social justice which entails a “grant of privilege” (p. 95).

Social justice is viewed by conservatives as an advocacy of socialism and a command economy and contrary to the underpinnings of the free market economy and traditional conceptions of liberties which have advanced Western civilization (Hayek, 1982). Those on the right believe the institutions of a free society should place an emphasis on greater personal responsibility and promote benevolence by those better-off rather than

inventing large governments and centralized solutions. Government action to redistribute goods is seen as a taking of liberties and leading to a welfare state and totalitarianism (Feser 1997).

Pope John Paul II in his 1991 encyclical *Centesimus Annus* wrote critically of the welfare state, but from a unique justice (not social justice) perspective. He felt it was unjust to relieve those who were well-off of their duty to the poor. He saw the welfare state as effectively relieving individuals of their direct responsibility to care and provide for the marginalized and poor. And, he feared the welfare state “leads to a loss of human energies and an inordinate increase of public agencies which are dominated more by bureaucratic ways of thinking than by concern for serving their clients” (Paul II, section 48, para 5). Rawls (2001, a proponent of social justice, is also not categorical about social justice. He takes the position that what individuals make of their opportunities and resources (going forward, as it were), the good or bad choices of the lives, is their own business, not the responsibility of society to rectify. Aquinas (1975) cautioned against a kind of social justice ideology because of its adverse impact on having others (including the state) do for people those things that citizens have a duty to do for themselves.

The Liberty Ideology

Liberty is often defined in terms of rights (Rawls, 1996). In the case of liberties or rights, one can enumerate a list such as the right to pursue happiness or freedom from oppression. Such enumerated liberties vary greatly by content and form and can be found, as examples, in the social studies education literature (Misco & Shiveley, 2010), countries’ constitutions and laws, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948. It is common place for social studies teachers to have students begin to conceptualize rights by teaching about the constitution, legislation, and court cases which have created rights to a free public education, civil rights, etc. (Bailey & Cruz, 2013).

Both a liberty and social justice orientation support the concept of enumerated rights, but often differ over what should be a right, the interpretation of the right, and the best balance of rights to insure human flourishing. New legislation, amendments, and court cases contest the status quo and their implementation requires a new balancing of rights. As examples, both Reagan’s reform of the “social safety net” and Obama’s reform of health care reshuffled the balance. The first increased the rights of more prosperous individuals to not be compelled to support the less prosperous. The second increased the rights of individuals who were less prosperous by reducing the liberty of more prosperous individuals.

It was Mill (1869) who focused on the tension between the state’s need to both care for the common good and individual liberty and what “... limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual” (para 1). The solution for liberty advocates is not government or programs, but a free market economy and the concept of benevolence which can be traced to early Roman Catholic theological teachings. Benevolence is to be bestowed at the will of the relatively well-off not because of a right of the less well-off

but because justice and duty to human flourishing demands it. Aquinas (1975) also insisted that, with the exception of particular emergencies, justice requires that individuals in a community be free (have the liberty) to carry out their duties via their own free choices and actions; that is, benevolence should not be coerced by individuals, majorities, or the state but given freely if it is to be a virtue at all. A duty to benevolences should lead individuals to take action because justice compels them to promote the flourishing of others.

A liberty ideology, under the theory of subsidiarity, holds that justice is best implemented at the lowest level of human interaction based on an exchange of neighbor to neighbor or neighbor to groups (Finnis, 1998). It is considered “best” because it doesn’t sanction those with a greater set of “goods” to relinquish their duty (or relieve their conscience) to those less well-off by abdicating their duty to justice to the state, thus making it “the government’s problem.” And, it doesn’t centralize more power in the state than is prudent for a democracy. Pope Pius XI articulated the idea of subsidiary in *Quadragesimo Anno* (1931):

As history abundantly proves, it is true that on account of changed conditions many things which were done by small associations in former times cannot be done now save by large associations. Still, that most weighty principle, which cannot be set aside or changed, remains fixed and unshaken in social philosophy: Just as it is gravely wrong to take from individuals what they can accomplish by their own initiative and industry and give it to the community, so also it is an injustice and at the same time a grave evil and disturbance of right order to assign to a greater and higher association what lesser and subordinate organizations can do. For every social activity ought of its very nature to furnish help to the members of the body social, and never destroy and absorb them (para. 79).

Robert Nozick (1976) in *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* relates the idea of liberty to a free market economy and the rights of individuals to the products of their initiative. He makes the case that individuals produce all resources and they have rights to the things they produce, rights of equal merit as those who advocate the right to social justice. Thus, attempts to improve the condition of the least advantaged through redistribution of one person’s goods based on a social justice political platform is unjust because such actions deprive people of the goods and opportunities they have created by expending their own time and efforts and effectively make some people work involuntarily for others. F. A. Hayek in *The Mirage of Social Justice* (1978) maintains that social justice is essentially an excuse for the unwarranted exercise of power of government and leads to totalitarianism. Conservatives worry that to resolve all inequalities would require 100% equal opportunity and this would require a totalitarian state, therefore it must be a principle of justice that social justice platforms be advanced only up to the point at which it threatens personal liberty. They argue that more government succeeds in equalizing opportunities, the stronger becomes the demand that remaining failures of individuals must also be remedied.

Critique. Social justice advocates argue that the liberty ideology fails to sufficiently take into account the conditions of poverty fostered upon individuals through no fault of their own due to the circumstances of their birth and that, effectively, it is a taking of liberty. They point out that lack of opportunity is perpetrated by the inherent inequities of capitalism against innocent victims, depriving them of fundamental economic entitlements and cultural capital and thus requires some form of redistribution of capital to make equal opportunity even a possibility (Freire, 1980; Gutierrez, 1971/1988; Murrell, 2006; Rawls, 1971). They maintain that benevolence alone has proven to be insufficient to produce justice or social justice. So, it follows that a democratic government elected by the people should rebalance liberties through government action. Even, Hayek (1982), a liberty advocate, argued that people have duties to help each other even when those so obliged did not cause the distress to be alleviated, “There is no reason why in a free society government should not assure to all protection against severe deprivation in the form of an assured minimum income” (p. 87).

IDEOLOGY IN EDUCATIONAL SETTINGS

Promoting a democratic ideology has been a long-standing goal of social studies education and this essay, in part, is intended to bring the term into more common use. Dewey (1939, 2001), as an example, used the term “social change” to advocate the teaching of a democratic ideology that advanced society to “a more balanced a more equal, even, and equitable system of human liberties” (Dewey, 1946, p. 113). To achieve this end, he said that teachers must promote participation by students in the affairs of society “as a personal way of life” (Dewey, 1939/1976). Counts (1932) in the early part of the 20th century called on teachers to create a new social order. Bennett and Spalding (1992) identified how the transmission of an ideology takes place in the curriculum when teachers “Emphasize values, critical thinking, decision making and development of self, and/or social action; social studies importance in effecting change on a societal or global scale” (p. 272) and noted that the teachers were “frequently committed to social causes themselves, they hoped to influence students to use political power, understand cultural pluralism, or accept multiple perspectives” (p. 270). Leming (1992) referred to the differences in ideological stances between professors of social studies education and social studies teachers as “perspectives” (p. 293). At the same time, he made the case that social studies education has always promoted a democratic ideology, as ill-defined as “democratic” may have been defined at any given time in the Nations’ history:

No successful society in the history of the world has failed to recognize the necessary connection between cultural survival and cultural transmission. Consistent with a respect for basic human rights, educational institutions have always had a major responsibility in all societies to pass on the existing culture to the young. The social studies should play a major role in this regard (Leming, 1992, p. 310).

In examining one of the most widely used K6-12 civics textbooks (Massing, 2013) in the United States, *Civics in Practice*, the term ideology does not appear in the index. The emphasis in the text is on the kind of “cultural literacy” (Hirsch, 1987) that insures students have a working vocabulary of the operations of government. However, the concepts about the crucial ideological judgments about policies and approaches that citizens must make, what are referred to by Rawls (1996) as “the burdens of judgment” and “sources of disagreement” (pp. 56-58) are largely absent even though such judgments and disagreements are essential to civic literacy. Students, at any age, can be asked by a skillful teacher with grade appropriate content to consider contentious policies and approaches to government. Given that textbooks are often viewed by social studies teachers as the “outer boundary” of the content they teach (Dunn, 1991) and teachers’ understanding of the complex concepts of ideology is, at best, uneven given their licensure requirements, it is all too easy for social studies teachers to pass over the kind of potentially controversial and emotional deliberations that can lead to the formation of a democratic ideology.

Expecting social studies teachers to promote a democratic ideology, while not indoctrinating to a specific political platform, makes teaching social studies uniquely challenging. Social studies instruction, at least subliminally, consists of ideological, political ideological, and political ideological platforms undergoing scrutiny. Under the leadership of a teacher, students are making choices based on their civic values and personal virtues. Subjecting ideological stances and political platforms to the kind of deliberate scrutiny of a trained social studies educator using the first principles of open-mindedness and critical thinking gives students the ability to justify their ideological stance and platform preferences to themselves and others as part of a collaborative effort (Dewey, 1933). Greater use of the term ideology as a contextualizing device for those “big ideas” and decisions would make the goal of the learning and forming my ideology more explicit and the content more meaningful (Duplass, 2006; Erickson, 2002).

The NCSS prefers the term “democratic traditions” over democratic ideology when it defines “civic competence” as the preparation of “well-informed citizens and a civic-minded citizenry that can sustain and build on democratic traditions” (National Council for Social Studies [NCSS], 2008, p. 1). Miller-Lane, Howard and Halagao (2007), in referring to this goal, amplify its meaning to include advocacy of a democratic ideology based on a just society, i.e., “pursuit of a more inclusive, just, and equitable society” (p. 563). The idea that schools should be institutions that promote a democratic ideology has long standing, but promoting a particular brand of change - a particular political ideology or platform - can be problematic for educational systems in a democratic state (Dewey, 1916).

The National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education (NCATE) provoked objections from right leaning education critics (Foundation for Individual Rights in Education [FIRE], 2006; National Association of Scholars, 2006) when it introduced the goal of social justice into the teacher education certification program standards. The NCATE position was later withdrawn (Duplass & Cruz, 2010; Wasley, 2006) but it brought the term under wider scrutiny (Will, 2006). Although NCATE withdrew its call for the social justice standard, many colleges

of education such as Teachers College of Columbia University (Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, 2006) continue to use the term and advocate social justice, as opposed to justice, as a value or disposition teachers should acquire while in training (Westheimer & Kahne, 2004).

Leming (1992) found an “ideological chasm” between professors of social studies education more left leaning orientation and teachers of social studies more right leaning perspective. Rothman, Lichter, and Nevitte (2005) found that only 15% of college professors self-identified as right leaning or conservative and 72% self-identified as left or liberal. From these statistics one should be cautious to conclude that educators do not adhere to an ideology of critical thinking and open-mindedness as a first principle. However, the continued use of the term social justice as part of the ongoing narrative and a survey of students (American Council of Trustees and Alumni, 2004) indicated that nearly half of the students complained that there were biased approaches in their courses toward a social justice orientation suggest that not all faculty are immune from the temptation to advocate specific political ideology or platforms.

IDEOLOGY AND TEACHING CIVIC LITERACY

As the gatekeeper of the learning process (Thornton, 2005), teachers of social studies are shaping or, at least influencing, the ideology of their students. What they chose to teach, what beliefs overtly or covertly are promoted in the dialogue, how they use the textbook materials, and how they interact with students have the potential to engage or not engage students in ideological considerations: “Education is not a neutral enterprise” (Apple, 2004, p. 1). It should be the deliberative process of the classroom that gives a voice to students and allows them to confirm or change their ideological identity (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004). That the formation of a personal ideology entails more than learning the kind of traditional academic content taught in schools such as mathematics or science, that it becomes part of who one is, creates a challenge and duty that is unique to teachers of social studies (Darling-Hammond, French, & Garcia-Lopez, 2002; Lallas, 2007; Wade, 2007). As E. Doyle McCarthy (1994) points out:

Ideologies bestow identities. For what is known and believed and thought are not merely knowledges, beliefs, or thoughts, they are what I know and what I believe and what I think. They inscribe in what I do, who I am -- my identity (p. 423).

Teachers in the other disciplines, with perhaps, the exception of literature, work with definitive content: The topics in mathematics, science, grammar, etc., are, with few exceptions, value neutral; the ideological opinions of faculty, family and communities have little to bear on a skill or content that is to be learned, and personal opinion or beliefs are largely irrelevant to the learning process. Conversely, in social studies much of the content is not definite, as an example, the interpretation of “the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed” is subject to one’s ideological stance.

The social studies classroom is intended to turn the novice opinions of students into thoughtful judgments worthy of citizenship (Duplass, 2008). To do so requires teachers and students to “weave them (referring to logic and beliefs) into unity,” (Dewey, 1933, p. 34) that unity being, an ideology. To form an ideology, students need the kind of knowledge that is presented in social studies classrooms and will evaluate that knowledge based on their civic values and personal virtues. One’s ideology creates a framework for interpreting and contextualizing social studies topics as they are encountered in the classroom. Concurrently conclusions reached while considering those topics are used by students to reshape their developing ideology and preferences going forward. It is the events (wars, as an example), movements (Civil Rights and Women’s Liberation), and programs (health care reform, social security) that give rise to the deliberations that lead to the examination of existing stances and new ideological considerations (Howard, 2007). It is, in the end, as Rawls (2001) put it, the “burdens of judgment” that lead to different ideological stances because the issues that come forward are complex and ambiguous, requiring students to weigh relative and competing evidence. As Dewey (1922) pointed out:

Deliberation is not to supply an inducement to act by figuring out where the most advantage is to be procured. It is to resolve entanglements in existing activity, restore continuity, recover harmony, utilize loose impulse and redirect habit...Deliberation has its beginning in troubled activity and its conclusion in choice of a course of action which straightens it out (p. 139).

Although teachers and students bring their ideology, political ideology, and political platforms into the classroom (Ellsworth, 1988; Kincheloe, 2008), it is social studies classrooms and instruction that have the potential in a democratic society to provide a safe harbor for individuals to reflect on their motivations and ideology. Because the deliberations should be led by someone more committed to students’ personal development than a political ideology and trained to be deliberative, thoughtful, and analytical, students can be enculturated into a democratic ideology. It is by teachers modeling open-mindedness and critical thinking (and demanding it of their students) during the deliberative process about complex topics that students come to advance their democratic ideological stance (Dewey, 1928, 1933; Halpern, 1998; Hare, 2003; McCutcheon, 1995; Reid, 1999; Siegel, 1988). This is not the same kind of critical thinking and objectivity argued for in the other disciplines because only in social studies does this also lead to values reformation (Duplass, 2008). The student and the teacher, by acknowledging their ideological ethos and using open-mindedness and critical thinking, create a pathway to a more honest, rational assessment of the ideological stance each wishes to take going forward (Robertson, 1996).

CRITICAL THINKING, OPEN MINDEDNESS, AND IMPARTIALITY

Dewey characterized critical thinking as “intellectual integrity, observation, and interest in testing their opinions and beliefs that are characteristic of the scientific attitude” (1934/1986, p. 99). Regarding open-mindedness, he stated, “There is no belief so settled as not to be exposed to further inquiry,” (Dewey,

1938/1978, p. 16). He called for education to develop “a quality of mind at once flexible and concentrated in dealing with new material, a certain attitude of mind, a mental openness and eagerness” (1890/1969, p. 51), and an “open-minded preference for conclusions that are properly grounded” (1910/1978, p. 202). Students, through a social studies education, are expected to mature into the same commitment (or disposition) toward open-mindedness and critical thinking as their teachers, what Shor (1992) refers to as “critical thought.” This disposition toward open-mindedness and critical thinking is a necessary part of a democratic ideology. It is the basis of social studies educators’ more matured, refined, and consistent yet elastic ideological perspective that is expected to be modeled in the classroom. And, for students, it distinguishes the classroom experience from the myriad of partisan and hyperbolic narratives that they are exposed to outside the classroom.

Educator Neutrality

Educators are not expected to be ideologically neutral, but need to be self-aware of their preferences for specific a political ideology and ideological platforms. Kelley (1986) argued that they should maintain committed impartiality that is make their preferences explicitly known to their students so as not to indoctrinate. With such a disposition, teachers of social studies can avoid indoctrination while promoting values and virtues considerations that lead to students developing their own ideology. However, open-mindedness and critical thinking, as essential as they may be to democratic ideology instruction, are not ends but means. And, admittedly, even these means can be argued to be less than perfectly ideologically neutral but to reflect a more democratic ideological orientation embedded in the traditions of Western civilization (Hart, 2001). With that caveat, the question to be answered is: What is the democratic ideology end to which these means should be directed?

Dewey (1916) warned about the limits of trying to define such an end as it inevitably reflects the circumstances of the day and one can easily drift into specific political ideological preferences. However, given the current harsh political rhetoric, polarization of left and right politics, institutionalized and changing education standards and goals, and teacher accountability systems, a clearer statement about the “end” to which social studies education should be directed would seem to be valuable. Changing the dialogue about social studies goals to one that focuses on ideology formation has that potential.

LIBERATION

Dewey defined liberty as “power, effective power to do specific things” (1987, p. 360). In today’s language, cultural capital and agency are frequently used. The idea is that human beings, to be truly liberated, require the economic, intellectual and emotional means to freely make choices about their well-being (Bandura, 2001). Teachers of social studies might best be thought of as more than purveyors of content, but as liberators who use social studies content to free individuals from circumstances that prevent their agency and thus prevent them from forming a holistic identity and becoming able to participate in more of the

liberties established or aspired to in a society. The personal and developmental nature of democratic ideology formation can be expressed in the ideas of authenticity and autonomy (Guignon, 1993, 1999).

Authenticity

“Authenticity aims at defining and realizing one’s own identity as a person” (Guignon 2006, 136). Dewey (1931), pointed out the lack of integration in modern man’s behavioral and psychic life-- the contradiction “between outer and inner operation”-- to be a particular challenge in modern society and an impediment to social change (p. 318). Encouraging students’ natural inclination to create a consistent and holistic identity is, unlike for other teachers, an essential role for social studies educators (Bennett & Spalding, 1992) because such an identity is necessary for a thoughtfully produced democratic ideology. To become authentic is to liberate oneself. Guignon (1999) explains the importance of authenticity in shaping a personal ideology and its relationship to a democratic ideology:

It [authenticity] is not just a matter of concentrating on one’s own self, but also involves deliberation about how one’s commitments make a contribution to the good of the public world in which one is a participant. So authenticity is a personal undertaking insofar as it entails personal integrity and responsibility for self. But it also has a social dimension insofar as it brings with it a sense of belongingness and indebtedness to the wider social context that makes it [authenticity] possible (p. 163).

Teachers should recognize that “every pupil must have a chance to show what he truly is....” (Dewey, 1915/1979, p. 297). The social studies classroom offers a unique venue in society in which young persons can test and reflect on their own identities (what they are) and ideology in a nurturing environment, and thus further their authenticity and autonomy (Byrd, 2012). Taylor (1992) explains that one’s authenticity and autonomy can be forged, “Only against a backdrop of things that matter...only if I exist in a world in which history, or the duties of citizenship, or the call of God, or something else of this order...matters crucially” (p. 15). A social studies classroom should provide that “backdrop.”

Autonomy

In the modern democratic state, autonomy encompasses the idea that citizens should be liberated - free to choose their goals and behaviors. Human dignity and liberty consists largely in one’s freedom to be autonomous, “whereby each individual is thought to have a unique identity, an original way of being human, to which he or she must be true” (Taylor 1992, p. 38). In turn, it involves a duty that one will reflect critically on one’s principles, consider one’s circumstances, decide how to live, and act based on those reflections. Society formally creates the opportunity for this endeavor through the social studies classroom. This requires that social studies educators encourage students to take and articulate political ideological positions that reflect

their developing autonomy and authenticity, even if those platforms are less mature and differ from the teachers own ideas of the ideal balance between liberty and social justice.

This deliberation, however, does not extend to political ideological positions that effectively would deprive others of their liberty. A student espousing a racist view or a preference for the advantages of a dictatorship, as examples, would effectively be advocating a political ideological stance that would not grant to others the opportunity to be liberated, to achieve autonomy and authenticity. As disappointing as such assertions may be, it is futile for a teacher to try and coerce a student into a revised ideological stance that would be more democratic. Teachers are bound by the precepts of open-mindedness and critical thinking even as they would contest such basic undemocratic notions espoused by a student. By deliberating with students in the true spirit of supporting students' development, students are given the freedom to reflect and hopefully adopt a different ideological stance. The teacher and student should jointly assess the student's evidence and claims as part of a nurturing deliberation. The process entails the teacher providing an alternate perspectives and facts, but also, encouraging the student to reflect on his or her own identity and ideology as sources of the existing notions (Fisher, 2011). The concepts of authenticity and autonomy provide a construct for understanding liberty as a function of agency, rather than a set of rights.

CONCLUSION

The idea of a teleological evolution to a "more humane society" (Sleeter & Grant, 2009, p. 190) as part of the natural order of the cosmos (Mayr, 1992) is embedded in Western civilization thought (Hart, 2001). The advancement to a more humane society is achieved through an ideology directed toward greater justice for individuals (MacIntyre, 1981). The conflict between the ideologies of liberty and social justice depicted in this essay should be embraced as a necessary tension that has shaped Western civilization and is necessary to the advancement of a democratic ideology and justice. The concept parallels the observation of Jeffrey Hart (2001) in *Toward the Revival of Higher Education*, makes the case that the tension created by proponents of an Athens view of the world and a Jerusalem view of the world is a metaphor for philosophy/reason vs. scripture/faith and it serves as a dialectic that has propelled Western civilization to its status as the greatest provider of liberty and social justice in the history of humankind. If social studies educators and their students can embrace the tension, they will be less entrenched in their personal dedication to a liberty or a social justice ideology, and more engaged in open-mindedness and critical thinking. Students will be better prepared to make choices going forward based on developing civic values and personal virtues which form the basis of a democratic ideology. By promoting an understanding of the tension between liberty and social justice, social studies educators affirm the need for Dewey's "social change" as a duty of each individual and generation toward the advancement of humankind. Hanan Alexander (2003) offered the following perspective:

The political success (of the West) entails the creation of modern liberal democracies that enable people who hold conflicting conceptions of the good to live in a common civil society...

This capacity to influence (within reasonable limits) one's own destiny in such a way that is neither a function of previous causes nor a matter of chance, but a matter of choice, intent, and purpose, lies at the very heart of the democratic ethos. It is because human beings are agents able to govern their own actions that they are also capable and worthy of governing their collective lives. Democracy is a form of government that presumes a society of moral agents, and the first task of liberalism is to protect democratic citizens' capacity to exercise their agency (pp. 367-378).

Social studies educators and students' adoption of the four pillars of a democratic ideology-- open-mindedness, critical thinking, social justice, and liberty-- should be the most fundamental goal of a social studies education.

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